Former Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan has revealed fresh details about the military thinking behind Operation Sindoor, including how India handled escalation, why the Sargodha strike went ahead after Pakistan sought talks and what may have happened at Kirana Hills.
Chauhan, who retired as CDS in May 2026, was speaking at the Vivekananda International Foundation's VIMARSH event in New Delhi on 25 August 2026. His remarks offered a rare account of some of the operational decisions taken during the India-Pakistan military confrontation.
Among the revelations was his explanation of the reported activity around Kirana Hills, an area associated with Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure.
Sargodha strike went ahead after Pakistan sought talks
One of Chauhan's most significant disclosures concerned the timing of the strike on Sargodha.
Chauhan said Pakistan had contacted India at around 10 am and indicated that it wanted to talk. At around the same time, he said, the Air Chief asked whether the Indian Air Force should proceed with the planned strike on Sargodha.
His response, according to Chauhan, was: "Once the Pakistanis had picked up the phone and said they wanted to talk at about 10 AM, the Air Chief asked me whether he should strike Sargodha. I said, ‘Go ahead’.”
Chauhan said he then asked the Air Chief to identify two more targets.
The account indicates that India's military leadership retained strike options even after Pakistan had reached out for talks. This is Chauhan's account of the decision-making at the time.
Skardu was considered, but weather changed the plan
One of the additional targets identified was Skardu.
Chauhan said: "I said, could you please identify two more targets, so one of the targets he identified was Skardu. We gave a yes, but after some time, the weather was bad over it and they had to change over to Bholari.”
According to his account, adverse weather made the planned operation against Skardu impractical, resulting in Bholari being selected instead.
The disclosure highlights how operational conditions could alter India's target planning during the confrontation.
Why did India use the lower airspace?
Chauhan also explained India's decision to use the lower airspace during Operation Sindoor.
He described it as a “third option”, distinct from the land-based response following the Uri attack and the large air package used after Pulwama.
In his words: "During Operation Sindoor, we decided to use a third option, that is, to exploit the lower airspace. That means it would have kept the threshold of conflict low. It would have assured success and then there would have been an element of surprise.”
Chauhan said this approach offered three advantages: keeping the threshold of conflict low, providing greater assurance of success and retaining an element of surprise.
The lower-airspace approach included the use of systems such as drones and loitering munitions. It should not, however, be read as meaning that conventional aircraft were not involved in Operation Sindoor.
What happened at Kirana Hills?
Perhaps the most closely watched part of Chauhan's remarks concerned Kirana Hills, located around 10 kilometres north of Sargodha.
The area has been associated in public reporting with Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, which had led to speculation about whether it had been deliberately targeted during Operation Sindoor.
Chauhan offered a different explanation.
He said Indian forces had deployed loitering munitions around Sargodha to search for Pakistani radar systems. "Before those strikes, we had sent in a lot of loitering missions at Sargodha and Kirana Hills is about 10 kilometres north of Sargodha. So the loitering mission is looking for radars which are in and around Sargodha.”
He explained that such a munition could remain airborne while searching for a target and, if it failed to find one, eventually come down.
Chauhan then said: "It must have come and hit one of those hills. So that could be one of the reasons as to what people asked, because Pakistani media also showed some kind of images in which there was smoke coming out from Kirana Hills.”
His explanation suggests that any impact at Kirana Hills was not the result of a deliberate decision to target the location.
Was Kirana Hills deliberately targeted?
According to Chauhan, no.
He said the loitering missions were looking for radar targets in and around Sargodha, rather than being sent specifically to strike Kirana Hills or Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure.
That distinction is important.
While some reports describe the incident as an Indian loitering munition striking Kirana Hills, the precise circumstances are based on Chauhan's account. The safest description is that a loitering munition may have inadvertently hit one of the hills while searching for radar targets.
The article therefore does not establish that an Indian strike deliberately targeted a Pakistani nuclear facility.
Why did India want the final strike?
Chauhan also spoke about India's approach to escalation.
He said one of the principles in the escalation matrix was that India should retain the ability to deliver the final military strike.
His exact words were: "One of the couple of principles which we thought in the escalation matrix which we laid for ourselves was that the last strike or the winning note will always be delivered by us and not by the Pakistanis.”
The remarks provide an insight into how India's military leadership approached escalation during the confrontation.
Rather than treating the operation as a single round of strikes, Chauhan's account suggests that Indian planners maintained additional options depending on how the situation developed.
What did Chauhan say about Pakistan's assessment?
Chauhan also made claims about Pakistan's efforts to assess the impact of its own strikes.
He said Pakistan continued trying to obtain imagery after 10 May to establish whether its attacks had hit their intended targets. “They were actually after 10th also till about 12th they were trying their best to obtain images so that they have some evidence.”
Chauhan said commercial satellite imagery was available from companies in the US and China, and that Pakistan also explored other sources.
He later said: “But since they are not able to hit any target, they got no evidence.”
That statement is Chauhan's assessment, rather than an independently established finding. It should therefore be read as his account of Pakistan's efforts to assess the outcome of its strikes.
What did Chauhan say gave India an advantage?
Chauhan also attributed India's performance during Operation Sindoor to better situational awareness and coordination between the three services.
He said: "If I had to list out a couple of reasons for India’s victory, I would say that we had better situational awareness, better battlefield transparency because we are better networked.”
He said the Army, Navy and Air Force had access to the same operational picture, allowing them to make decisions with a broader understanding of the battlefield.
He added: “Army, Navy and Air Force, this situation was available to us in one manner for all of us. So, we were able to make better decisions.”
Chauhan also credited political direction with giving the armed forces room to plan the operation.
"The second thing I could attribute to victory was, I think, clear political direction, which gave us a free hand to plan operations.”
These are Chauhan's assessments of the factors behind India's performance.
The larger picture
Chauhan's disclosures offer a glimpse into military decision-making that was not publicly visible during Operation Sindoor.
Three themes stand out: escalation control, operational flexibility and the use of lower-airspace capabilities.
The Sargodha episode shows that, according to Chauhan, India retained strike options even after Pakistan sought talks. The Skardu episode demonstrates how weather affected target selection. And his comments on Kirana Hills offer an explanation for an incident that had prompted speculation about whether India had deliberately targeted an area associated with Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure.
But the distinction between what Chauhan said and what can be independently verified remains important.
On Kirana Hills in particular, the most precise formulation is that Chauhan said an Indian loitering munition may have inadvertently hit one of the hills while searching for radar targets around Sargodha. He did not describe the area as a deliberately selected target.
His remarks add new detail to the public understanding of Operation Sindoor while offering a rare insight into how India's military leadership approached targets, escalation and battlefield decision-making during the confrontation.
TL;DR | News At a Glance
Former Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan has shared fresh details about India's planning and decision-making during Operation Sindoor.
Chauhan said India approved the Sargodha strike even after Pakistan sought talks.
Skardu was identified as another potential target, but bad weather led to a change in plans, with Bholari selected instead.
He said India chose to exploit the lower airspace as a “third option”, helping keep the conflict threshold low while retaining an element of surprise.
On Kirana Hills, Chauhan said an Indian loitering munition may have inadvertently hit one of the hills while searching for radar targets around Sargodha.
He said Kirana Hills was not deliberately targeted.
Chauhan also described an escalation principle under which India wanted the last strike or winning note to come from its side.
